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Introduction
A firm engaged in foreign direct investment (FDI) faces exchange rate risk; the exchange rate between the home and host currencies might change in the future, once transactions are contractually finalized (transactions exposure), and the firm's value might change due to its sensitivity to exchange rate movements (economic exposure). Alternative formulations of exchange rate risk may have different implications for firm FDI; how the firm views exchange rate risk is critical. With operations under the jurisdiction of a foreign government the firm is also exposed to political risk -it must estimate the potential costs it will face due to unstable governments, regime change and/or changes in policies. We examine the effects of three formulations of exchange rate risk and political risk on FDI for U.S. multinationals.
A large number of studies have investigated the relationship between exchange rate risk and FDI.
1 Times series studies include those by Igawa (1983) , Cushman (1985 Cushman ( , 1988 and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) . These studies examined bilateral FDI flows between the U.S. and a handful of developed countries (U.K., France, Germany, Canada and Japan), generally finding a positive relationship between exchange rate risk and FDI. On the other hand, others argue the greater the exchange rate risk, the less appealing the investment (Kelly and Philippatos, 1982) .
Cross-country studies as Clare (1992, 1998) , Benassy-Quere, Fontagne, and Lahreche-Revil OECD nations to 42 developing countries, finding a negative response to exchange rate risk.
Brzozowski's (2006) study covers FDI flows to 32 transition and emerging countries, and shows a relationship which, although not as strong as expected, is still negative. Clare's (1992) study covers the FDI flow from the U.S. to 14 developed and 15 developing countries, and finds a strong negative relationship for each set of countries as well as across the entire spectrum of countries.
The impact of political risk is addressed in Nigh (1985) , Biswas (2002) , Bussie and Hefeker (2006) and Carstensen and Toubal (2004) , among others. Nigh's (1985) study covers FDI from the U.S to 24 countries (developed and host country developing) over 21 years. For developing countries he finds firms react to host country conflicts as well as between the host and home nation. However, only conflicts between nations mattered for developed country investments. Biswas (2002) , using a sample from 44 countries over eight years, finds that firms prefer locations where property rights are respected and democracies over autocracies. However, regimes of shorter duration are preferred to those of longer duration. Using Euromoney's political risk variable Carstensen and Toubal (2003) focus on FDI flows from seven OECD countries to transitioning Central and East European, and finds significant risk-aversion. Bussie and Hefeker (2006) examine the investment flow to 83 developing countries over a number of years. In the cross section portion they find the existence of democracies, religion and government stability significant. Pooling countries over time they find internal conflict, external conflict, law and order, and bureaucratic quality important as well.
Against this background we examine the impact of both exchange rate risk and political risk on FDI, using three alternative formulations of exchange rate risk. We next discuss why exchange rate and political risks matter in the context of a simple illustrative model of a profit maximizing multinational deciding on how to allocate its investment across countries. This is followed by a discussion of the data and the strategy used in our estimation. In our empirical work, we examine effects of the FDI behavior of U.S. multinationals.
Exchange rate movements and political risk
Consider a U.S. multinational with a foreign subsidiary, the price of all inputs and outputs in all markets are constant, and the randomness of the exchange rate is the sole source of variation in the value of the firm. Given risk-aversion, the firm's objective is to maximize its expected utility of the market value in terms of the home currency in the presence of exchange rate risk. The firm's measure of this risk is the variation in the exchange rate and any transaction occurring in the foreign currency is subject to this risk.
The firm engages in sales ( f S ) and incurs costs ( f C ) in the foreign market resulting in foreign currency denominated profits (operating cash flows) which must be converted to dollars at the prevailing exchange rate ( e % ). Therefore, We assume that ( a ) is the proportion of output ( g ) which is sold to the U.S. market or negotiated in terms of dollars and 0 1 a < < , ( a′ ) is the proportion of final output ( g ) which is sold in the foreign market or in terms of the foreign currency and
(1 ) a a ′ = − , P is the price of final goods sold in terms of dollars which is assumed constant regardless of destination, f P is the price of final goods in terms of the foreign currency which is assumed constant regardless of destination, and ( )
is the foreign currency denominated cash flows.
The objective of the firm is to maximize expected utility of profits subject to the constraints imposed by a three factor production function, g F L K 
. This is the basis of our work.
Data and Variables
To examine the determinants of a U.S. multinational's allocation of its FDI in the world the data The data for both "all industries" and "manufacturing" FDI outflows by country were obtained from the BEA's "All Nonbank U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Capital Outflows by Country and Industry" for the years 1999 to 2003, and covers all foreign affiliates, not just majority-owned. The BEA only makes the yearly sales data available for majority-owned affiliates whereas the FDI is for all foreign affiliates. Our assumption is that the sales of majority-owned affiliates follow the same pattern as for all foreign affiliates; the FDI of majority-owned affiliates account for the lion's share of all FDI, so this less than perfect match should not pose a problem.
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We estimate a succinct model with four explanatory variables, overall political risk and three variables that are discounted by r : sales in dollars ( $ S ); sales in the foreign market ( f S ) (denominated in terms of the host country currency and then converted to dollars through the exchange rate, e ); and the exchange rate risk variable which also includes f S . Since $ total f S S eS = − , and as f S is also contained in the exchange rate risk variable, to reduce the effects of multicollinearity the $ S and f eS were combined and total S was used. This was divided by ( r ) to obtain the respective sales variable.
Political risk ( PolRisk ) measures each nation's political stability. The greater the political stability, the larger is this index and the more appealing the location for investment. We employ the "Political Risk Score" from Euromoney's Changes in k P were used to compute the index in subsequent years.
Yearly sales data for majority-owned foreign affiliates by country and industry were obtained from the BEA. Affiliates sell to their host country, to other countries in their region, to the United States, and/or to other countries in the world. We view both the host county and its region as the foreign market; all sales in this market are in terms of the host country's currency.
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Sales to the U.S. and the rest of the world are treated as occurring in dollars.
The construction of the sales variable presents difficulties, because of missing information that varied by country and time. The BEA's 1999 Benchmark Survey provides enough detail to obtain host country sales (Table 3F2 ) and sales to the other countries in the region (Table 3F10 ). Combining this information provides an estimate of foreign market sales and therefore sales in terms of the host country's currency. Due to disclosure restrictions this method of estimating the breakdown of sales cannot be used for China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Peru, Czech Republic and Poland; sales to their region's were not available (in the case of Thailand, sales to Japan is missing). In these cases by using for all members the rates were converted back to the historical currencies using the fixed rates.
Foreign currency denominated cash flows ( ) and the estimated coefficient is γ .
As stated above, we capture the firms' consideration of exchange rate risk in three ways using the end of month nominal rates.
(1) ExchRiskP: calculate the variation using the exchange rates in the year in which the investment takes place to see whether firms react instantly to exchange rates movements. (2) ExchRiskPP: use exchange rates for the previous and present year to observe firms' reaction to current movements in light recent historical patterns. (3) ExchRiskPF: use present and next years' exchange rates to examine firms' sensitivity to the present and how they feel about the future, relying on some form of rational expectations. 
Estimation and discussion
Our strategy is to examine FDI by U.S. firms at two levels: in all industries and on the subset of only firms in manufacturing. Recall from our illustrative model, the equation we are estimating is Our country data contains both developed and developing economies. Chow tests indicate that it is appropriate to pool the data; 9 however, pooling masks interesting differences.
In our discussion we highlight differences of each country groups as well as discuss the pooled sample. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 . Tables 2 and 3 present the regression results for "Manufacturing" and "All Industries", respectively. In the case of manufacturing industries only (Table 2 ), regardless of sample or method used for capturing exchange rate variation, sales always positively affect FDI and are significant at the 1% level in all cases but one where it is significant at the 5% level. This result is expected. In the case of less developed countries exchange rate risk is negative -the greater the risk the less FDI -and significant in two out of the three cases. In the case of "present" rates it is significant at the 1% level and for "present and future" the 5% level (Clare 1992 found the same pattern in manufacturing). Recall our measure of political risk has political risk decreasing as the index increases. The estimation results show that as political risk decreases, FDI increases, and is significant at the 10% level for two of the cases and the 1% level for the third case. This compliments the findings of Nigh For developed countries the coefficient on the exchange rate risk variable is always negative and is significant in two of the three cases (1% level for the "past and present" case and 10% for the present and future, and not significant, but close, for present). Lower political risk positively affects FDI but is never significant. This may reflect a feeling that the factors which are considered in constructing this variable (non-payment of loans, goods, dividends, and the non-repatriation of profits) are not really or no longer an issue of general concern when investing in the developed nations. The dummy variables are all negative but are significant at the 10% level in only two out of the nine cases. This may reflect a more generalized feeling of security (a feeling of less vulnerability) in developed nations.
For the pooled sample of developing and developed countries, in all cases the coefficient for exchange rate risk is negative, but significant only at the 10% level for one case. Lowered political risk again has a positive effect on FDI and is significant at the 10% level in two cases and 5% in the other. Given the factors considered in constructing the political risk variable, this may be revealing greater concern for these issues in the developing countries relative to the Nigh (1985) found firms engaging in manufacturing sector FDI exhibited risk aversion towards conflicts within developing but not in developed countries. Brzozowski (2006) used the change in a nations international reserve assets as a measure of credit worthiness. In his overall sample he found firms reacted as expected, while his subsample of firms in transition economies showed no reaction (11 of the 13 subsample countries were European).
Our results in manufacturing follow Nigh (1985) , and when we look at the countries in the developed sample we find 15 of the 25 are European. The variation in political risk relative to its mean across the countries is 0.11 for developed countries, 0.30 for developing and 0.33 for the entire country group. Keeping in mind that we are studying alternative investment locations of US firms, firms may feel that political stability is not a major issue among developed countries. Once included with developing countries the preference has a chance to be revealed.
In the case of all industries (Table 3) , regardless of the sample used (developed, less developed or combined) and regardless of method used for exchange rate variation, sales always has the expected positive coefficient on FDI which is significant at the 1% level. For the less developed sample of countries exchange rate risk always carries a negative coefficient (as expected) which is significant in 2 out of 3 cases at the 1% level. Political risk consistently, but unexpectedly, shows that decreasing political risk decreases FDI. While not significant in two of the cases, it is significant at the 10% level where exchange rate risk is measured using the present variation. This is in contrast to what is found in manufacturing. Included in all industries are mining, utilities, etc., which may not be able to select their location as easily as manufacturing industries. 10 The dummy variables have a negative sign in all but one of the cases and are not the magnitude of the coefficients shows a much wider range of movement in this case from a 21% decrease to a slightly less than 15% increase.
When pooling the developing and developed samples, in all cases as exchange rate risk increases, FDI decreases, and is significant at the 5% level for the "past and present" case and the 10% level for the "present and future" case. Decreased political risk again encourages FDI and is significant at the 10% level in two of the three cases. The yearly dummy variables are always negative and significant at the 10% level in one case and the 5% and 1% levels in all 
Conclusion
We examine the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI), exchange rate risk and political risk. Using data for 53 countries during the years 1999 to 2003, we find that exchange rate risk has a significant and negative impact on FDI for all countries, both developed and developing. Furthermore, we find that political stability has a positive effect on FDI, but is only significant for developing countries. Interestingly, when the analysis is moved from "Manufacturing" to encompass "All Industries", the relationship between political risk and FDI for developing countries is positive, which is paradoxical.
Exchange rate risk has a negative impact on the foreign direct investment of U.S.
multinationals. When investing in developed nations the firms appear to take past and present exchange rate variation into consideration. However, when investing in less developed nations, past and present variation does not appear to weigh as heavily as present and future variation.
This could be because the firms feel the past movements in the exchange rates may not be as 
Notes
1. There is a difference between the effects of changes in the exchange rate and exchange rate risk. Exchange rates in this literature and throughout the paper are defined in terms of home currency/foreign. Risk is the dispersion of outcomes around some expected value or increased variability in the outcomes; this is the view used here and in the studies cited. As the dispersion increases, risk increases, negatively impacting FDI. 2. Based on tables 2Y1 and 3Y1 from the 1999 benchmark survey, over 96% of the U.S. direct investment position at year-end 1999 was majority-owned as were 99.7% of all FDI outflows for the year. Note, the data in tables 2Y1 and 3Y1 are based on the firms' fiscal year whereas FDI data available from the BEA is based on the calendar year. 3. When we compared Transparency International's Corruption Index with the Political Risk score used in this study we obtained a correlation coefficient of 0.82. 4. In private communication by the BEA to the authors, 76% of firms surveyed responded to this question; of these, 79% said their affiliates books were kept in terms of the host country currency. 5. For this we need to assume that the sales of the affiliate to the Rest of the World follows the host country pattern of trade. 6. For Singapore and Poland when "sales to the rest of the region" (calculated under this approach) were combined with the other sales components a figure was obtained which was larger than total sales reported, indicating overestimation of foreign market sales. To correct for this, sales to the rest of the region were reduced by the appropriate amount. 7. Our data is for only five years, but many countries. Each country may not change much during the period; including country specific dummy variables may hide some important relationship. Because of the wide disparity in variable magnitude across countries the White adjustment was employed to counter the impact of heteroskedasticity on the standard errors of the coefficients. 8. The correlation between political risk and any form of exchange rate risk is never greater than 0.30 in any of our samples. 9. Before combining them into one large sample a Chow test was run to make sure such action was appropriate. Since the exchange rate risk variable is calculated three different ways then the Chow test was run for each of these ways for both the "all industries" and "manufacturing only" samples. In the case of "all industries" for ExchRiskP, ExchRiskPP and ExchRiskPF values for the F statistic of .73, .99, and .79 were obtained respectively which with df of 7, 248 indicate pooling is appropriate at both the 2.5% and 5% level. In the case of "manufacturing only" for ExchRiskP, ExchRiskPP and ExchRiskPF values of .44, 1.30 and .55 were obtained which with df of 7, 211 again indicating pooling is appropriate at both the 2.5% and 5% level. 10. In fact, the correlation between FDI in developing countries for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors is only 0.275. 
